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THE URBAN RESPONSE TO THE RURAL LAND REFORM
MOVEMENT DURING THE CHINESE CIVIL WAR: 1945-1949

By: Elizabeth Grad
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Introduction
China's internal condition immediately following the end of Japanese occupation
was complicated and precarious. The conflicting interests of the Kuomintang and the
Communists were pushing the nation into civil war and pressure from the United States
only hastened the collapse of an already weak: internal structure. The Japanese occupation
of China during the war had significant implications and affected the political fortunes of
the Kuomintang and the Communists in diverse ways.
Initially, the War of Resistance against Japan promoted nationalism and Chiang
Kai-shek and the Chinese Communists united for the good of the nation. l This unity,
however, was short lived and the two political factions were never able to compromise on
a political policy that would unify and help to democratize modem China. Ambitious in
their goals and equipped with strong leadership, the Communists chose to pursue a path
of resistance, as well as one of social revolution. The opportunity to utilize the incursion
of the Japanese began in north China. Experienced with guerilla warfare, the

Comm~nists

were able to organize a resistance movement in the countryside behind enemy lines. As a
result of their mobilization and effective use of the rural masses by the end of the World
War II the Communists could claim control of an area occupied by nearly 95 million
people.
Conversely, the Kuomintang was not able to organize an effective resistance
movement against the Japanese. Plagued by corruption, weak leadership, and a growing
sense of popular discontent, the Nationalist government was unable to find unity in the
face of violent Japanese aggression. The Kuomintang chose to pursue a path of
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resistance to Japanese invasion without addressing the social and economic needs of the
vast majority of the Chinese people? Despite the Kuomintang's ineffectiveness in terms
of addressing the needs of the people, Chiang and his government were heralded as
national heroes when the defeat of the Japanese was secured in August 1945. It was
following the war of resistance and upon the government's attempt to solidify its power
that opposition to the Kuomintang grew. The opposition's voice became more
predominant and contributed to their unpopularity and difficulty in maintaining support.
The defeat of the Japanese in 1945 was pivotal; initially, it meant a resounding
faith in the Kuomintang. However, the policies pursued by the government in the
immediate post-war months led to a rapid dissipation of popular support. Chiang Kai
shek and the Nationalists were faced with the paramount task of reconversion of enemy
occupied territories and addressing the demands of two distinct sectors of the nation, the
urban and the rural masses.
The government takeover of enemy institutions and territory was imbued with
corruption and public disapproval from the outset. Suzanne Pepper notes in her
comprehensive study of the Chinese civil war that "just as the Government offered no
authoritative procedures for resolving fairly the issue of [enemy] collaboration, so also it

lSuzanne Pepper, Civil War in China, (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers
Inc., 1999), 7.
2In Mao Tse-Tung's essay "On Coalition Government" he quotes the Kuomintang as
advocating a theory that when "confronted with a formidable enemy, we should not talk
about Democracy or the people's welfare; we had better wait until the Japanese are gone"
(as stated in "On Coalition Government" in Selected Works ofMao Tse-Tung, Vol. 4,
[New York: International Publishers, 1956], 293). He goes on to stress that socially "the
points of controversy between the two parties really hinges on the issue of agrarian
relationships" (294). This theory will playa significant role in the analysis ofthe
response generated by the Kuomintang land policies and subsequent claims of
government inadequacies.
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failed to provide any equitable and orderly means for disposing of enemy property.'''
Weak policies and contradicting actions in the takeover process only strengthened
popular disapproval of government policies.4 The economy also suffered and the
government's failure to minimize the financial consequences caused by the war's end
only furthered the disintegration of Nationalist rule.
In addition to the political barriers between the Nationalists and the Communists
parties another facet of China's political spectra, the middle forces, began to voice their
opinions concerning the welfare and the future of China. In terms of exercising political
power the middle forces played a negligible role; however, their influence and
prominence as the deciding element in who would prevail in the Kuomintang and
Communist disputes was monumental. The middle forces, which were comprised of
businessmen, intellectuals, students and professionals, wielded a significant amount of
power in terms of influencing public opinion and securing the political power of either of
the two preeminent political parties. Ultimately, they would be of vital importance to the
Communists in terms securing a base of support in the cities, and their response to land
reform was significant in that it undercut the authority of the Kuomintang government.
The Communist alternative to the Kuomintang response to China's internal
struggles focused around organizing and addressing the needs of the masses. The
ideology of the Communists coalesced around the ultimate aim of social revolution with

Pepper, 16.
4 A thorough account of the confused and corrupt practices of the Kuomintang during the
period immediately following the defeat of the Japanese can be found in Suzanne
Pepper's text, Civil War in China. Of particular interest is the account of reconversion of
enemy properties in Shanghai.
3
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power in the hands of the workers and support from the rural masses.5 As noted earlier,
the initial strategy ofthe Communists in the War of Resistance against Japan was to
mobilize the countryside to fight the Japanese, while pursuing a policy of social reform.
The Communists, unlike the Government, were able to increase their strength amongst
the peasants while fighting the war. Utilizing the war as a base to broaden their popular
support, the Communists success can be attributed to "their social and economic policies;
the relative competence and integrity with which those policies were being implemented;
and the discipline of the Communist armies.',6 The most significant and revolutionary of
the policies pursued by the Communists during the civil war years was that of land
reform.
Land reform was the key element of one of the greatest social revolutions in
history, the Chinese Civil War. As early as 1927, Communist leader Mao Tse-tung was
calling for a peasant movement to overthrow the feudal agrarian elements of rural
society. In Mao's essay, "Investigation into Peasant Movement in Hunan," he noted that
"the peasants attack as their main targets the local bullies and bad gentry and the lawless
landlords, hitting in passing against patriarchal ideologies and institutions, corrupt
officials in the cities and evil customs in the rural areas."? But while addressing the
needs of the peasantry, the Communists faced the same task of pacifying the cities as did
the Kuomintang forces. In terms of furthering its agrarian policy of rural land reform
while maintaining neutrality and winning the support of the urban middle forces the

5 James Sheridan, China in Disintegration: The Republican Era in Chinese History 1912
1949, (New York: The Free Press, 1975), 148.
6 Pepper, 201.
7 Mao Tse-tung, "Investigation into Peasant Movement in Hunan," Selected Works, (New
York: International Publishers, 1954), 1:23.
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"correct political line was not capitulation, but rather 'developing the progressive forces,
winning over the middle forces and isolating the diehards.',s The Communist Party would
not surrender to political ideologies other than its own, and to achieve its aim of a
socialist revolution the Party sought to incorporate the politics of the middle forces with
its own. An analysis of the urban response to rural land reform is possible through the
examination of articles that appeared in the urban press, the official writings of
Kuomintang, Communist, and third party officials, and other primary documents during
the period of the civil war (1945-1949).
An examination of existing documents from the time period leads one to conclude
that each political party politicized the land reform movement to put forth its own agenda
and adapted the land reform movement to sustain each of the parties own identities and
strive for internal peace. The magnitude of the concept of land reform and the complete
overhaul of an agrarian system, which had existed for nearly two thousand years, was
bound to bring significant changes across political, social, and cultural fronts. The
actualization of land reform and the implementation of rural land policies by the Chinese
Communist Party sparked a vigorous response across all fronts; within the media of the
time emerged a consensus of opinion that land reform was necessary. The argument thus
became one of a political nature and mirrored a convergence of ideas as to whether the
reality ofland reform could be accomplished; in its wake the question emerged as to
which political agenda would ultimately prevail. One can trace the evolution of land

Thomas Lutze, "The Battle for the Middle Forces: United States Relations with the
Chinese Communist Party, 1947-1948" (Master of Arts thesis, University of Wisconsin,
1989),42-3.

8
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refonn through the urban responses and see how ultimately the Communist policies
succeeded in winning the revolution and the support of the urban middle forces.
Dr. Sun Vat-sen and Land to the Tiller
Before examining the Communist approach to land refonn it is important to
provide an overview of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People and the impact
that his call for "land to the tiller" would have on the concept of land refonn. Dr. Sun
Vat-sen was a Nationalist and founder of the Chinese Republic. He promoted the initial
calls for revolution in the early 1900's and was dedicated to eliminating the threat of
imperialism and the corruption of Chinese government. Revolution gained more support
following the Boxer Rebellion and in 1911 when the city of Hupeh fell to the
Revolutionists the defeat of the Manchu government would follow in only one hundred
days. Sun's initial goal of a revolutionary take over of the government had been
accomplished. Following the revolution, Sun chose to "devote himself to the task of
educating the people to an understanding of the fundamentals of democracy.'ll
Unfortunately, Sun's aims would be superceded by the government and policies of Yuan
Shih-kai and the completion of the revolution was postponed until Chiang Kai-shek
assumed power in 1926.
It would be a mistake to assume that Sun's years of study and promulgation of his
democratic ideologies were wasted following the revolution and its subsequent
dissipation. Sun's Three Principles of the People "constitute the basic ideals and policies
of the [nationalist] Revolutionary movement."lO Significant to the topic of this paper and

Sun Yat-sen, San Min Chu I: The Three Principles ofthe People, (Republic of China:
China Publishing CO., n.d.), vi.
lOIb'd
...
1 ., Vlll.

9
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the ultimate basis for land reform policies on both the Communist and Nationalist sides
were Sun's ideas concerning land reform.
One of the main goals of the Three Principles of the People was to accomplish
land reform. Sun commented that "[t]he process of social change...begins with the
landowners." and although China broke away from the feudal system, "because of the
lack of industrial and commercial progress, social conditions are," just about the same as
they were in the feudal era. I I Sun continued by stressing that the "plan which we are
following is simple and easy-the equalization oflandownership.,,12 By having the
government take back the land redistribute it Sun gave credence to his slogan land to the
tillers. Based on this concept the Communist embarked upon a land reform movement
that would playa significant role in China's social revolution. The Kuomintang would
also boast its adherence to Sun's principles, although in practice and ideology Chiang
Kai-shek differed substantially from his predecessor, Sun Yat-sen.
The Communists and Land Reform
The most significant advancements in the revolution were the land reform policies
ofthe Communist Party. Mao Tse-tung and the Communists sought to unify the masses,
beginning with the peasants and then form a united front with the urban workers.
The complexities of the land reform movement, however, are substantial and it is
important to examine the process involved in implementing the rural land policies. To
fully understand the character of the rural land reform movement one must examine the
Communist's approach during the Japanese occupation and leading up to the Party's
policies during the Civil War.

llIbid., 173.
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One can generalize that China's feudal agrarian system was comprised of five
basic components. The landlord class comprised the highest strata of rural society.
Landlords owned the land, did not work in the fields, and relied upon hired labor. Rent
and interest collection were the landlords main sources of income. Rich peasants worked
in their fields, but were fortunate enough to have surplus property, implements, and
income. Often rich peasants employed hired labor, collected rents and profited from
interest on loans they had issued. The middle peasants worked their own land and made
enough to sustain an average standard of living. Some middle peasants were able to use
hired labor, although often times they did so only during the busy times of year. Poor
peasants owned only a small plot of land and often no farming implements. Poor peasants
took out loans and paid rent to the landlords and rich peasants; often they had to hire
themselves out as laborers. Hired labor completed the five basic divisions in China's
feudal rural society. Hired workers owned no land or implements and relied on selling
their labor power to maintain a living. 13
There were significant differences between the distribution of land and wealth
between landlords and poor peasants and one can assume that the circumstances also
varied across the many faceted regions of China. It is within this framework and during
the war of resistance against Japan that the Communist Party chose to pursue a
"moderate" program of rent and interest reduction and progressive taxation.
Acknowledging that the conditions facing the rural areas in China were not universal, the
wartime policies of the Communists focused on weakening the feudal elites. If the

12Ibid.,

177.
13 Thomas Lutze, Class Lecture, (History 300 Modem China: Illinois Wesleyan
University, Bloomington, IL, March 9,2001).
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ultimate goal of destroying feudalism was to be realized the Communist Party had to
pursue a more rigorous course of action. The end World War II and the subsequent
reaction of the rural masses, in particular the poor peasants, would serve as the base form
which the Party was able to implement the first of a series of more thorough land reform
methods.
The tensions between landlords and their tenants were at an extreme in 1945. Pei
Xiaotong, a non-Communist anthropoligist, keenly observed that

those in the landlord class who have been depending upon income from
rents must sooner or later be eliminated. Landlords who themselves cannot
cultivate the land can only rent their land out to others. Yet this piece of
land will not feed both the landlord and the tenant at one and the same
time. The landlord cannot find a way to eliminate the tenant and get
income... [and] the tenant can cultivate the land without the assistance of
the landlord. 14

Pei's description was accurate and the Communists realized the volatile nature of
class conflict in the rural regions that he referred to. The Communist Party was
reluctant to disregard its previous policy of rent and interest reduction in favor of
outright confiscation oflandlord's property, however. The exhausted state of the
people following the defeat of the Japanese indicated apathy towards war and
violence. If the Communists were to seize landlords' holdings and foster conflict
with the Nationalists, they risked losing the support ofthe middle forces that
desired peace. The Communist Party thus decided to pursue its wartime rural
policy of rent and interest reduction. Mao continued to emphasize uniting the

Pei Xiaotong, China's Gentry, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 119. Pei
will be discussed in greater detail later on in the paper. His observations are significant
in that he represents a voice of the middle forces.
14
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masses in a vigorous campaign against the landlord class stressing that rent and
interest reduction must be pursued with sincerity and support. Interesting to note,
however, is that Mao also acknowledged "this movement would surely involve
excesses...but as long as the excesses resulted from genuine mass struggle, they
could be corrected later.,,15 Mao's mention of excesses stems from the fact that
peasants had already begun to seize land; the class conflict had boiled over into
open aggression.
The defeat of the Japanese created a struggle for local power. Many local
officials had collaborated with the Japanese and when Japanese withdrew they
abandoned their offices. The peasants spontaneously attacked those remaining
traitors, many of whom were also landlords. In addition to anti-traitor sentiments,
the areas that had been liberated from the Japanese earlier in the year called for
"the consolidation and development of the fruits of the wartime rent and interest
reduction campaigns.,,16 The Communist Party chose to respond to the peasants
needs with a directive in December of 1945. In the old liberated areas the
directive that called upon officials to re-examine the rent and interest reduction
campaign and increase production. In the newly liberated areas the Party wanted
the masses to launch an anti-traitor campaign, the settling of
accounts movement and rent reduction. Settling of accounts itemized each grievance
against a landlord and sought compensation for the landlord's exploitation. The campaign
in the newly liberated areas was known as the speak bitterness campaign and in certain

15Thomas Lutze, "China's New Democratic Revolution: Complexities of the Anti-Fuedal
Struggle 1945-1949," (Houston, Texas: Southwest Conference of Asian Studies, October
2000),9.
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areas the settling of accounts resulted in the equal distribution of land and an end to the
land problem.
The campaign, however, was not without its faults. Often times it was hard to
convince the villagers to initiate the speak: bitterness movement. Cadres had to convince
the peasants that they should reconsider their fears and trust the effectiveness of the new
campaign. When the peasants were finally persuaded to speak:, the cadres were
confronted with yet another challenge. It was difficult to distinguish between who was
and was not a traitor. Traitors were often the landlord's assistants and the elites had
commissioned them to serve in the Japanese puppet governments. These assistants
became the instrument through which anti-resistance campaigns were organized and
resources for the Japanese troops were gathered. Thus it became obvious that the first
recipients of the peasant's anger during the Anti-Traitor and speak bitterness campaign
would be these assistants. Ultimately, the Party would promote condemning the assistants
for their actions and stress that the real blame should be placed on the landlords that .
forced them to collaborate with the Japanese.
Despite the often violent and excessive actions of the poor peasants the new
campaigns were successful in acknowledging the extent of landlord exploitation and the
resentment that had grown amongst the peasants. As the misdeeds of the landlords
became public knowledge so to did the realization that the peasants' civil and moral
rights had been violated. The peasant vigorously pursued the policy of "settling
accounts." The landlords faced criticism from multiple peasants; soon their "accounts"
owed to peasants exceeded their assets and "land was thus confiscated, not as policy, but

16Ibid.,

10.
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as payment for debt.,,17 The concept land to the tiller was being realized through the
actions of the masses.
Under this premise, the Communist Party embarked upon a revision of the rural
land system. As the peasants demanded land, the Communist Central Committee decided
to alter its previous wartime policy of rent and interest reduction, and address the
peasants demand for land that had become apparent in rural movements. The party's
goals are clearly outlined in the 1946 publication ofLiu Shaoqui"s "Directive on the
Land Question" generally known as the May 4th Directive. Liu details eighteen points
through which the land reform policies were to be carried out.
The directive calls for the Party to "firmly support the demands of the masses as
they realize the principle of 'land to the tiller' by taking land from the landlords." IS
Confiscation and redistribution ofland would be formally organized and implemented by
the Party. Only the land of collaborators was subject to confiscation; other measures were
adopted to deal with non-traitor landlords There were four other methods of land reform
that were being simultaneously conducted in 1946 by the Communist Party. Suzanne
Pepper outlines them as:

(1) direct confiscation applied primarily to the property of Japanese and
their collaborators, but also to black lands and land acquired through
mortgage foreclosures; (2) the sale of landlord holdings to tenants and
others; (3) a land contribution movement; and (4) the equal redivision
of village land and property.19

17 Ibid., 12.
IS Liu Shaoqi, "Directive on the Land Question," Selected Works ofLiu Shaoqi, (Beijing:
Foreign Language Press, 1984),373.
19 Pepper, 277.
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It was under these guidelines that the party instituted its rural land policies in the
liberated areas.
In areas were the Communist Party had not secured control, the wartime policy of
rent and interest reduction was the only policy that was carried out. The Party's policy in
the non-secured areas was deeply entrenched in their belief that the middle peasants
should not become targets of the land reform movement. The Directive called for Cadres
to give "proper consideration...to the livelihood of middle and small landlords," they
were to be treated differently from "big landlords, evil gentry and local tyrants.'~o
Communist policy of maintaining the support the middle forces was largely tied into their
efforts to always consider the needs of the middle and rich peasants. The Directive
stresses the need to bring the middle peasants into the struggle and not alienate their
interests. According to the directive, "[s]olving the land problem in the Liberated Areas
with a population of over 100 million will help substantially to consolidate these areas
and promote the nationwide movement towards democratization.'.21
The land reform policies of the Communists continued to vary even with the
pronouncement of the May 4 Directive. Once again the varying condition from region to
region affected the policies implementation. In old liberated areas there were no more
collaborators and in some cases land had already been redistributed. In addition to the
varying conditions regionally, within each region differences arose amongst Party
officials concerning how to interpret and implement the seemingly "please all" directive.
It is within this context that what became know as "rightist" deviations appeared.

Liu Shaoqui. 372.
17 Ibid., 377.

20
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Cadres were accustomed to the rent and interest reduction campaign and were slow to
understand and adopt the new policy. Others were fearful of Nationalist attacks and the
repercussions of government victory. Still others were confronted with personal
conflicts; some cadres were from landlord and rich peasant background and had become
cadres to preserve their family's interests.
Conversely, there were cadres who energetically engaged in land redistribution
and found that there was not enough land to give to the poor peasants. As a result a series
of gaps existed in the distribution process. Compounding the growing inequality was the
armed and often violent opposition of landlords to the new policies. Reports of cadres
being murdered by landlords became more prevalent and subsequently evoked a stronger
response amongst the peasants. Some cadres were criticized for siding to strongly with
the "peasant line." Deviating from the Party's aim of uniting with the middle peasants
and neutralizing the rich peasants, brought with it more violence and potential for
threatening the Communist's support in the countryside. The middle peasants, and on a
lesser scale, the rich peasants, played a significant role in ensuring the success of land
reform. The "leftist" deviations of energetic cadres proved to be a significant concern of
the Party and threatened to jeopardize the success of the land reform movement.
Ultimately, the policies set forth in the May 4th Directive were aimed at
destroying the existing patterns of land tenure and transfer of the ownership of land to the
peasants who tilled it. Initial urban responses to this directive were limited. An editorial
comment published in the Sin Wen Pao claimed that "Nationalist troops have recently
captured an important secret Communists document. .. [t]his document was a directive
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concerning the land revolution.',z2 The article went on to outline the policy set forth in
the Communist's directive. The editorial quoted Dr. Phillip Fu, aide to U.S. Ambassador
John Leighton Stuart, who claimed that the "matter of unifying the land system in China
should be the problem that should first be solved.... The differences between these two
parties are due to this fundamental problem.',z3 The article outlined the government's
approach to land reform as that which is advocated in the "Principles of the People's
livelihood of the Three People's Principles" and also the Kuomintang's adaptation of the
land policy advocating "land to those who till it.,,24 The article calls upon the government
to reform the land system and warns that if it is not accomplished "it will greatly affect
the ruling power of the Kuomintang.',z5 This initial realization by the Nationalist
government that land reform was the key to winning the revolution and sustaining
political power came at a time when the Communists were already strengthening their
base of support by means of a land revolution. Further reports indicated a variety of
measures were taken to promote land reform as the answer to domestic strife. A news
extract from the Communist New China News Agency in Peiping reported that in areas
were land reform had been accomplished "the Communists Northeastern Administrative
Committee approved a 4,500,000,000 farm loan...and the principle work of the
Commission" was to lead an agricultural production campaign.26

In December of 1946 another article appeared in the Communist New China

22 Sin Wen Paa, "Reform of Land System," Shanghai, September 4, 1946 (CPR).
23Ibid.
24Ibid.
25 Ibid.
2~ew China News Agency, "Communist Northeast Commission Approves Farm Loan,"
Peiping, December 21,1946 (CPR).
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News Agency (Peiping). The article, "Communists Enforce Land Reform Through
Purchasing of Landlords' Land," indicated that the Communist's multi-faceted policy
was successful. Landlord Tang Shen-kun was quoted in the article as being "very
satisfied with issuance of public bonds which helped the poor to purchase land...and
made compensations for the landlord.'.27 The other forms of land reform, including the
sale of landlords' holdings, were merely experimental policies aimed at devising a system
of uniform land reform measures. These measures also played a significant role in the
Communist Party's defense strategy. Mao declared in October 1946 in his essay "A
Three Months' Summary" that:
The experience of these three months had proved that the peasants stood
with our Party and our army against the attacks of Chiang Kai-shek's
troops wherever the Central Committee's directive of May 4 was carried
out firmly and speedily and the land problem was solved radically and
thoroughly. The peasants took a wait-and-see attitude wherever the "May
4th Directive" was not carried out firmly or the arrangements were made
too late, or wherever this work was mechanically divided into stages or
land reform was neglected on the excuse of preoccupation with the war.
In the coming few months all areas, no matter how busy they are with the
war, must resolutely lead the peasant masses to solve the land problem,
and on the basis of the land reform, make arrangements for large-scale
production work next year?8
Mao was accurate in his assessment of the peasants support for the Communists land
reform policies. The settling of accounts that occurred shortly after the war was generally
followed by efforts to redistribute the land and property and eventually culminated in the
Party's formal policy as set forth in the Outline Agrarian Law.
The CCP Central Committee issued a formal directive on October 10, 1947. The
Outline Agrarian Law authorized a systematic land reform program aimed at completely

27New China News Agency, no title given, Peiping, December 26, 1946 (CPR).
28 Mao Tse-tung, "A Three Months' Summary," Selected Works, 4: 116.
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abolishing the landlord class and equalizing land ownership. The Law provided a definite
set ofprinciples to guide the expropriation and redistribution of land. According to Mao,
the new law reaffirmed the principles of the May 4th Directive, but also "explicitly
corrected a certain lack of thoroughness in that directive.'''9 The lack ofthoroughness
stems from the directives "please all" approach and the excesses that were generated as a
- result of implementing the directives policies.
The 1947 document is revolutionary in that it calls for the elimination of
landlordism rather than just the abolition of landownership. The significant points of the
Law include: (1) Abolition oflandownership rights oflandlords; (2) Cancellation of all
debts incurred in rural areas prior to present agrarian reform; (3) Abolition of
landownership rights of all ancestral shrines, temples, schools and other corporate
entities; (4) Equalized redistribution of all landlords' land, livestock, agricultural
implements, houses and grain to those who till; (5) Allotment ofland to landlords,
Kuomintang government and army officers and men and their relatives (excluding
traitors and war criminals) on an equal basis with the peasants; (6) Grant of land deeds to
individuals; (7) Free management of the land allotted to each individual; (8)
Establishment of hsiang (large group of villages) as the unit for land redistribution; (9)
Execution of the reforms by village peasant associations, and committees elected by them
and by peasant congresses; (10) Establishment of people's tribunals composed of
peasants' representatives and government appointees to punish any who violate the Law;
(11) Exemption of merchants' and manufacturers' properties and enterprises from

29 Mao Tse-tung, "The Present Situation and Our Tasks," Selected Works, 4: 164.

•
18
redistribution. 3o Unique to the Law was the realization that local conditions varied across
China and to accomplish any sort of national overhaul of the land system the Party gave
broad powers to locally elected peasant associations and governments.
Frank C. Lee, a non-Communist Chinese journalist, published an article
immediately following the promulgation of the Draft Agrarian Law. He noted that a
report on the success of the Law was premature, however, "a briefreview of the agrarian
reforms that have already taken place in the Communist dominated areas indicates that
most of the measures in the program had been initiated months before it was announced
in its present form.,,3!

Lee solidified the Party's concern over the spontaneous

movement to settle accounts that had begun with the end of World War II. Peasants
confronted local landlords, many of whom collaborated with the Japanese, and sought
revenge. The Communists were able to use the Japanese incursion and formulate a
realistic program and strong leadership base to support the desires of the peasants.
William Hinton gives an excellent summation of the rural land reform movement and the
rural response in his text Fanshen. 32
The urban response to the 1946-1947 land reform policies indicated a general

30 The summary of the Outline Agrarian Law was drawn from the Basic Program of the
Chinese Agrarian Law, passed by the nationwide Agrarian Conference of the Chinese
Communist Party, September 13, 1947. The Law was publicly issued on October 10,
1947.
3! Frank C. Lee, "Land Redistribution in Communist China" Pacific Affairs, Vol. 21,
No.1, (1948), Pacific Affairs University of British Columbia, Database online, Available
from JSTOR, 22.
32W illiam Hinton's Fanshen, an account of revolution in a rural Chinese village, has
become an essential tool for analyzing the effects of civil war in the Chinese countryside.
The in-depth analysis of the mobilization of peasants under the Communist line and the
subsequent organization of rural class struggle are set in the context of the events that
occurred in Long Bow village. Hinton's portrayal of the rural situation in Communist
liberated areas is essential to grasping the magnitude of Communist land reform policies.
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approval for the Communists policies. An article published in March of 1946 indicated
that "after the Communists explained to them that they are asked to observe the
Communist policy of reducing the land interests, etc. It was reported that satisfactory
results have been obtained by all who have applied.'''3 These successes were reported
before the formal promulgation of the Outline Agrarian Law.
A negative review of the Communist land reform movement was issued in a
November 1947 publication of the Hua Pei Jih Pao, a KMT newspaper. 34 The article
claimed that the first task of the Communists "was massacring and looting...next, the
Communists dealt with the so-called wealthy people... [and] it is said that next the
Communists would deal with the womenfolks.',35 This is the only instance were it is
suggested the reform efforts by the Communists weren't taking place at all. Rather,
according to the Kuomintang, the Communists were merely slaughtering the people. A
pro-Communist radio broadcast made from the Communist Hsin Hua station in
December of 1947 indicates that the Communists protected the peasants from hostile
activities and those specifically anti-revolutionary in nature. The article noted that the

Shansi-Chahar-Hopei people's liberated area promulgated an
order...accepting the 'Fundamental Principles of the Chinese Land Law'
as the Land Law of the border area...ajoint proclamation, strictly
prohibit[ed] all anti-revolutionary acts tending to destroy land reforms and
guaranteein~ the farmers in the border area to thoroughly rehabilitate
themselves. 6

Ta Kung Pao, "Refugees Returning to Communists Areas," Peiping, March 23, 1946
(CPR).
34 The translator of this particular article notes in parentheses that the article is a
KMT/MOlorgan.
35 Hua Pei Jih Pao (KMT MOl), "Refugees from Shihchiachuang," Peiping, November
30, 1947 (CPR). Actually printed on December 3, 1947
36U.S. Consulate, Peiping, China, Translations Radio Broadcasts ofCommunist Hsin
Hua Station, North Shensi, December 1, 1947.
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Overall, the initial efforts at land reform were covered in the press because of the radical
social revolution that they sparked. Reports of the success of the land reform movement
failed to indicate, however, the excesses and errors that grew out of the same movement.
Party directives and the attitudes of cadres and peasants were often in conflict.
Communist officials had hoped that by actively answering the rural demands of the
peasants that the masses would support the Communists and form the backbone of the
Communist's rural army, ultimately to unite and support the proletariat. This support did
not come as easily as the CCP officials had hoped. Suzanne Pepper offers four reasons
for the reluctance of the peasants to participate and the challenges faced by the cadres in
addressing the needs of the people and maintaining their support.
Pepper first notes that the peasants were not willing to leave neither their newly
gained land nor their families to participate in the war against the government. Their
reluctance to join the Red Army was compounded by the increase in attacks by
Kuomintang forces in the liberated areas. The peasants had a genuine fear of losing their
land and more significantly their lives if the government were to successfully defeat the
Communists. Finally, the cadres lacked understanding of the Party's intentions and thus
the ability to resolutely dedicate themselves to the tumultuous rural situation?7 The
cadres saw land reform in a much different light then their superior Party officials.
Cadres faced a dual dilemma in that most of them were of landlord or gentry class origin
and had never entertained the thought of destroying feudalism, let alone distributing land
to the poor peasants. Cadres also "recalled that landlords had helped them during the anti

37 Pepper, 293.
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Japanese resistance...the old cadres entertained no genuine class hatred.'''8 The political
line of the Party, to evoke mass resistance against the oppression of feudalism with the
ultimate goal of a socialist revolution, was misunderstood, and the significance of the
peasant movement in defeating the Kuomintang not considered
The Party needed to clarify its intentions and the cadres had to overcome their
own doubts and "make the peasants understand that they would be able to keep their land
only if they were willing to fight for it.,,39 The Party also had to acknowledge that they
suffered from a loss of military security both within the liberated areas where land reform
had been carried out and in the areas were land reform had not been accomplished. In the
areas were land reform was in progress the Communists created their own enemy within,
the landlords. The threat created by the landlord class was one of the motivations behind
the radical and often excessive attempts to carry out land reform. The second threat came
largely from Kuomintang advances against Communist liberated areas.
The conflict in this case was two fold. Militarily, in the face of KMT aggression,
the Communists choose to adopt a policy of withdrawal rather than confronting a
superior military force. The retreat policy forced the peasants to submit to government
forces. The peasants became disillusioned and "were reluctant to restore the peasant
associations, or to form new militia units, or even to attend an open meeting, so little faith
did they have in the staying power of the Communists.,,4o The preeminent fear of the
peasants concerning the possibility of government revenge contributed to the low morale
of the peasants in regards to Communists victory and their role in the struggle. In areas

38 Ibid.
39 Ibid., 295.
40Pepper. 303.
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were land reform had not been carried out the Communists had no base from which to
draw support.41
To combat the potentially fatal implications oflosing peasant support, the
Communists abandoned their policy of retreat and returned to a military strategy that had
served their needs in the past, guerilla warfare. Not only did the party advocate guerilla
warfare, they also called for the simultaneous carrying out of land reform.
A pro-Communist urban response to land reform, with a particular concentration
on the print news media, was almost non-existent. A radical upheaval was taking place
in the countryside, compounded by a savage civil war, famine, and near economic
collapse and there was scant attention paid to these issues by some of the most prominent
news organs. 42 The few articles pertaining to land reform and indirectly the policies of
the Communists were appeals to "[refrain] from adding to the burden of the
farmers ... [and] to confiscate the wealth of those who got rich because of excessive
profits.,,43 An editorial published in the Wen Hui Pao in Shanghai in July of 1946
suggests that the Communists reform policies may be the right answer, but ultimately the
correct policies need to come from a unified government. The author called for a careful
examination of "the political and economic systems in the CP-controlled areas to see if
they are more sound and more progressive...so as to decide whether they should be

41 Suzanne Pepper gives an excellent summation of the problems facing the Communists
as a result of the land reform campaign of 1946-1947. Much of the above was drawn
from here assessment of the situation in Chapter 7 of her text Civil War in China.
42 By prominent news organs I am referring to the U.S Consulate General translations of
newspaper articles in Shanghai, Beijing, Tientsin, Taiwan, and Nanjing. In addition to the
print, translations of radio broadcasts from North Shensi Hsin Hua Station are also
lacking a response.
43 Shih Shih Hsin Pao, "We appeal on Behalf of the Rural Communities," Shanghai, June
20, 1946 (CPR).
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retained or discontinued.,,44 The media seemed to be advocating a political solution to the
Kuomintang and Communist dispute, rather than reporting the actual events. They were
politicizing the issue rather than dealing with the every day realities of land reform. The
lack of coverage in the press suggests that the Nationalist government may have
intentionally censored or suppressed reports pertaining to the most radical years of land
reform. During my research it has occurred to me that there may have also been a
selective process of translations by the United States so as to represent the Nationalist
view rather than the successes of the Communists.45
Land reform was actively being pursued across broad areas of China, and in the
process it came to the attention of the Chinese Communist Party that certain errors and
excesses existed in its implementation. The first reports of a need to alter the existing
land reform policies, however, did not come from media reports of Communist tactics;
rather, it stemmed from the internal summations of the Party. A shift in the land reform
policies of the Communists can be detected unofficially in early 1947 and with more,
official backing in late 1947.
The National Land Conference that took place in September of 1947 had already
recognized a need for change and called for a concerted Party rectification campaign. It
acknowledged rightist errors and advocated a policy of rectification that centered on

Wen Hui Pao, "What is Wrong with the Situation?" Shanghai, July 10, 1946 (CPR).
45Support for this argument may be drawn from the United States reaction to the Dixie
Mission. The Dixie Mission was a group of United States soldiers sent to Yenan in 1944
to see if the Communists had effective measures to defeat the Japanese. Their positive
assessment of Communists strengths, including their land reform policies, prompted their
prompt withdrawal from China and removal from their official military positions by the
United States government. The U.S. pursued a specific agenda in China that was pro
Chiang Kai-shek and anti-communist no matter what the circumstances were (Taken
44
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reforming the work style of cadres and eliminating impurities in class composition that
had resulted from the excesses of the first rectification campaign. Regional conferences
were held and plans on how to engage in a second classification campaign were laid out.
The Party took an approach in which errors within the party were subject to public
criticism, beginning a trend in Communist rectification campaigns that would resurge
again in party politics most notably in 1957.46 William Hinton notes that the rectification
campaign of 1947 was characterized by

careful preparation [that] made the second classification far more precise
and scientific...with their newly acquired knowledge of the principles
involved in class analysis, both cadres and peasants were able to probe
more deeply than before into every aspect of village affairs.47

In December of 1947 Mao made a report before the Conference of the Central Committee
of the Chinese Communist Party addressing the current direction that the rural land
reform movement needed to take. The speech was broadcast from the Communist Hsin
Hua Station in North Shansi. He detailed the Party's policy and reiterated it was "to 'rely
on the poor peasants, to consolidate our union with the middle peasants and to
exterminate the feudalistic and semi-feudalistic exploitation system of the landed class

from a class lecture [Hist. 300, Modem China] given by Dr. Thomas Lutze at Illinois
Wesleyan University on March 12,2001).
46 party rectification would again be carried out under the banner of the Hundred Flowers
Movement, in an attempt to open society to discussion, thought, and criticism. Mao had
hoped to invoke large numbers of people to discuss the weaknesses of the Soviet style in
an attempt to generate enthusiasm for socialism and ultimately communism. This was
followed by a series of Party purges and rectification movements leading to the Cultural
Revolution.
47W illiam Hinton, Fanshen: A Documentary ofRevolution in a Chinese Village,
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1966), 435.
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and the old-style rich peasants.',48 On the heels of correcting rightist errors came a shift in
policy in January of 1948 that focused on rectification of leftist deviations. This new
policy seemed to be a fonnulation of ideas that had developed at different times in
different provinces and coalesced in an official acknowledgement of Party error. Mao
would later note that the problems had stemmed from

the partial but fairly numerous encroachments on the interests of the
middle peasants, the damage done to some private industrial and
commercial enterprises and the overstepping in some places of certain
lines of demarcation in the policy for suppressing counterrevolutionaries.49
The encroachment on the rights of the middle peasants was seen as a fonnidable error.
Concessions had to be made to the middle to broaden Communist support.
Mao came out with an intra-party directive on January 18, 1947, which set the
new guidelines for land refonn. He acknowledged that both rightist and leftist errors
existed. Each deviation was to be addressed on the basis of the situation in which it
thrived. Leftist errors now prevailed as the dominant concern of the party.50 One report
from a Taiyuan paper, with a Nationalist military slant, indicated that the rectification
campaign was "bloody struggles against wealthy villagers and landlords and Communist
cadre members.,,51 Hinton's documentary included an account of the Party's rectification

48 U.S. Consulate General, Peiping, China, "The Present Situation and the Tasks before
the Chinese Communists Party," in Translation Radio Broadcast o/Communist Hsin Hua
Station, North Shansi, January 3, 1948.
49Mao Tse-tung, "On the September Meeting-Circular ofthe Central Committee of the
Communist Party of China," Selected Works,5: 271.
50Mao Tse-tung, "The Present Situation and Our Tasks," Selected Works, Vol. 5.
51 Taiyuan Wan Pao (Gen. Yen His-shan), "Communist 'Struggles' increasingly violent,"
Peiping-Tientsin, January 22 1948 (CPR).
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campaign in rural areas. There were no reports of brutality in this phase of redistribution
and once the rectification policies were begun, things reportedly ran smoothly.52
The Central Committee issued another official policy, Directive on Land Reform
and Party Rectification Work in the Old and Semi-old Liberated Areas, in February. The
Directive modified Article Six of the Agrarian Law concerning the equality of land
redistribution and maintained that the needs of the poor would still be the primary
concern of the Party in areas where land reform had not been completed. Article 6 had
originally stated "all land of landlords in the villages, and all public land...together with
all other village land, in accordance with the total population of the village... shall be
unifiedly and equally distributed.',s3 The revision of Article 6 included a provision
protecting the rights of the rich and middle peasants ensuring "their houses and properties
should not be touched," but their land could be confiscated to meet the needs of the
poor. 54 A more systematic guideline for conducting land reform was also set forth. The
directive addressed how to handle redistribution in terms of varying types of property and
what measures to take in areas were land had already been distributed. The Party
maintained the rectification policy and broadened its span from the rural areas to include
towns, factories, and various organizations. Upper level Party officials were entrusted
with carrying out the campaign.

52W illiam Hinton's text Fanshen gives a detailed description of the rectification process
in parts IV and V.
53 Basic Program on Chinese Agrarian Law Promulgated by the Central Committee of the
Chinese Communist Party, 1947 as printed in Appendix A of William Hinton's text
Fanshen, 615-18.
54Supplementary Measures for Carrying Out the Basic Program on Agrarian Law, Draft
Promulgated by Hopei-Honan-Shansi-Shantung Border Region Government on Dec. 28,
1947, as printed in Appendix B of William Hinton's text Fanshen,619-22.
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The question of the middle peasants had been addressed and at least in areas
where land reform had been accomplished a concerted effort to unify with the middle
peasants had begun. Mao made a speech in April of 1948 that expanded upon the
erroneous treatment of the middle peasants and that also acknowledged the success in the
revolution would only come after the correction of other serious errors that had taken
place. The errors he outlined did not deal directly with the middle peasants; rather, they
were "leftist" deviations focused mainly on encroachments made on landlords and rich
peasants. In addition to these errors Mao commented on the notion of absolute
equalitarianism. Mao noted

[w]e support the peasants' demand for equal distribution ofIand in order
to help arouse the broad masses of peasants speedily to abolish the system
of land ownership by the feudal landlord class, but we do not advocate
absolute equalitarianism. ... There is a kind of thinking now current in the
countryside which undermines industry and commerce and advocates
absolute equalitarianism in land distribution. Such thinking is reactionary,
backward, and retrogressive in nature.55
He justified his position by reiterating that this shift in policy was essential to the success
of the Communist revolution. The policy line had not changed. In regards to agrarian
reform, Mao stated that the Party will "rely on the poor peasants, unite with the middle
peasants, abolish the system of feudal exploitation step by step and in a discriminating
way, and develop agricultural production.',s6 The revolution's ultimate aim
was the industrial transformation of society through the development of production,
beginning with land reform.
Mao pointedly commented that

55 Mao Tse-tung, "Speech at a Conference of Cadres in the Shansi-Suiyuan Liberated
Area," Selected Works, 5: 235-6.
56Ibid., 235.
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[t]he development of agricultural production is the immediate aim of the
land reform. Only by abolishing the feudal system can the conditions for
such development be created. In every area, as soon a feudalism is wiped
out and the land reform is completed, the Party and the democratic
government must put forward the task of restoring and developing
agricultural production, transfer all available forces in the countryside to
this task, organize cooperation and mutual aide, improve agricultural
technique, promote seed selection, and build irrigation works-all to ensure
increased production....The abolition of the feudal system and the
development of agricultural production wi1llay the foundation for the
development of industrial production and the transformation of an
agricultural country into an industrial one.57
The character and nature of Communist land reform was not only a social upheaval in
the countryside, but one that had significant implications for urban industrialization and
the modernization of China. The Communist's land reform policy would not shift again
until after their victory against the Kuomintang. It is now important to address the
Kuomintang response to calls for land reform and the Communist land reform policies
and the general demands of the urban public in terms of an agrarian social revolution. An
examination of the Nationalist's policies concerning land reform and their development
and change in terms of the Communists policies was clearly portrayed in urban media.
Both pro-Kuomintang and anti-Nationalist parties pleaded with the government to
address the rural issue.

The Kuomintang Response
The agrarian problem had existed long before the onset of World War II, dating
back to the 1920's. Two arguments have generally prevailed in the assessment of the
agrarian situation. The first emphasized the exploitative relationship between the
landlords and the tenant farmers and in the urban and rural spheres of the economy; the
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second argument focused on agricultural technology.58 The Kuomintang's land policy
during World War II was non-existent. The government focused on resisting the
Japanese before addressing the needs of the masses. A basic policy of rent reduction had
been set forth in the Land Law of 1926. A more in depth policy was formulated in 1930,
later to be revised to reduce rent further and eventually advocate the transfer of land to
those who tilled it (the revision occurred in 1937). Ironically, ''between 1937 and 1942
landlords increased their holdings in Szechuen from 65 to 70 per cent. .. [and] many
corporations were organized in 'Free China' for the sole purpose of speculating land.'.59
Little effort was made in the area of rent reduction. News articles printed in 1945 called
for the Kuomintang to address the needs ofthe rural areas immediately. A Shanghai
paper urged the

Chinese Government to carry out, with a firm determination, a policy of
agrarian reform so as to serve the purpose of post-war demobilization,
instead of being discouraged by the hindrances of such reactionary
influences [reference to Communist land reform policies].6o
The issue of demobilization seems to be the main concern of the author of this text, yet
the mention of land reform as necessary, and reference to the Communists indicated that
agrarian reform in reality and not just in concept was becoming a prominent issue. Many
of the articles published in 1945 also indicated that the public hoped for peace and an end
to all hostilities. A Kuomintang editorial published in December felt that "a black
shadow had been cast by the problem of the Communists" and that it was necessary for

57 Ibid., 237-8.
58Ramon H. Myers, The Chinese Peasant Economy: Agricultural Dev elopement in Hopei
and Shantung, 1880-1949, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), 13-24.
59Lee, 26.
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them to concede to government demands and policies.61 This article went on to further
discredit Communists policies by condemning the Communists phrase "liberated areas"
in favor of the government view that the entire country was liberated by the Nationalist
victory over Japan. The government had failed, however, to liberate the peasants by not
aggressively pursuing land reform.
The Kuomintang chose to advocate its rural policy following the end of the war
and at a time when serious devastation in the countryside had already occurred. The
nature of the rural situation was mentioned infrequently, but one article did address the
devastation apparent in rural Hunan. It was reported that "in addition to this heavy
[government] taxation, there is also famine, the decrease in labor available and the rise in
food prices" making the phenomenon of "cheap land but expensive food" a harsh rural
reality.62 The Kuomintang set forth its answer to these pleas for help at the Chinese
Agricultural Association conference held in October of 1946.
The 1946 Conference provided the opportunity for the KMT to publicly present
its policies. The fundamental measures advanced by the KMT were "that improved
techniques of agricultural production would solve China's problems in the
countryside.,,63 The commitments to rent reduction and Sun's principle ofland to the
tiller were set forth at an earlier meeting, the Political Consultative Congress in January
of 1946 and again in the Government's 1946 Land Law. The convening of the Political

Chien Sien Jie Pao, "Agrarian Reform as Solution," Shanghai, September 17, 1945
(CPR). Parenthetical addition my own.
61 Min Kuo Jih Pao "Let's Assume the standpoint of the Masses in North China to Talk
About the Problem of the Communists," Peiping-Tientsin, December 12, 1945 (CPR).
62 Sin Wen Pao, "The Exhausted Rural Districts in Hunan" by Shih Yen, Shanghai, June
6, 1946 (CPR).
63 pepper, 230.
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Consultative Conference (PCC) seemed to make the concept of democratic rule more
concrete with the decision on the part ofKMT, CCP, and minority party delegates to
support a cease-fire. The Kuomintang was also urged to pursue a more active land
reform policy by the United States. The U.S. issued a report calling for the abolition of
tenancy along the lines set forth in the Nationalist Law. An editorial, in response to the
China-United States agricultural mission, published in Shanghai in August 1946, noted "a
prerequisite for agricultural development in China is the realization of democracy and the
promotion oflocal self-government. .. [and a revision of] the policy ofa 25% reduction in
rental rates.'M The failures within the government's land reform policy were realized
within the first post-war year of their implementation. The tenancy reforms suggested by
the U.S. agricultural specialist would go unheeded by the Nationalist government.
The KMT land policy would vary little in concept as the civil war progressed, but
the motivations and implementation of land reform would change significantly in
response to the Communist land reform policies. The changes in Kuomintang policies
and the motivations behind them are most clearly indicated in the urban press's response
to the need for agrarian reform during the civil war years.
A strong faith in the power of the Nationalist government to help the rural areas
was evident in the first half of 1946. A Kuomintang editorial appearing in January
optimistically claimed that "we [the people] can infer that our government authorities are
resorting to all possible amicable means in which to put an end to the internal strife" by

Ho Ping Jin Pao, "How to Improve Chinese Agriculture," Shanghai, June 27, 1946
(CPR).
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having faith in the tasks set forth by Chiang Kai-shek in his New Year's Day address.65
The article outlined the two main tasks as being the ''reconversion and relieving of the
people from their sufferings... and secondly, to realize the democratic constitutional
administration and restore political power to the people as soon as possible.
The occupation of areas of Manchuria by Communist troops further aggravated
the tense political situation and the question of land reform. An article in the
Kuomintang newspaper, Ho Ping Jih Pao, indicated that

after hearing the report made by President Chiang Kai-shek before the
PPC session, the CP is fully aware that the Government and people
definitely will not recognize the so-called "Democratic Joint Anny" and
the ''popularly elected government',66

that had been established in Manchuria. The Communist invasion of Manchuria
indicated that the Chinese Communist Party was seeking to broaden its base of support
and expand upon a policy for the Northeast that was outlined in Mao Tse-tung's essay
"Build Stable Base Areas in the Northeast." Mao outlined a program in Manchuria that
supported the basic Party line of arousing the support of the masses to struggle for and
solve their problems, with the ultimate goal oflaying a foundation to defeat the
Kuomintang. 67 It is significant to note that this essay was written in December of 1945,
prior to the PPC. The Kuomintang response to the Northeast issue was to accuse the
Communists of "all kinds of ugly and stupid propaganda" and of trying to "split up the

Chian Sian Jih Pao, "Minimum Requisites for Restoration of Political Power to the
People," Shanghai, January 3, 1946 (CPR).
66 Ho Ping Jih Pao, "Intrigue and Trickery ofCP," Shanghai, April 10, 1946 (CPR).
67Mao Tse-tung, "Build Stable Base Areas in Northeast," Selected Works, 5: 81-5.
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Northeast, [and] overthrow the National Government.,,68 The government failed to
address the social issues that were being raised and fleshed out by the Communist forces.
The Communists have also made evident at this point that negotiations for peace with the
Kuomintang were not part of their political agenda. Most of the complaints that were
generated from the CP's occupation of Manchuria came from KMT organs that
politicized the issues rather than addressing the social revolution that was taking place in
Communist controlled areas. The Chung Yang Jih Paa (KMT organ) concluded that the
"Communists are bent on the total destruction of China.',69 These undocumented claims
put the government in a position highly susceptible to criticism, and a shift in the urban
response to government policies was evident by April of 1946.
The Ha Ping Jih Paa, for example, had previously vested its interest in its faith in
the government to provide effective relief for the agrarian sectors of China. An April
publication of the same paper featured a definite shift in their views of the government.
The article condemns the CNRRA, a government relief agency, for promising to supply
peasants with an adequate means for survival but instead "their promise remains an
uncashable check....[How is it that] in the Communist-controlled Central China Military
District [people] can get large amounts of relief funds and supplies?,,7o Questioning the
policies of the Kuomintang was becoming a popular theme in the urban press.
Many of the attacks centered around the collection of land taxes in kind. One
account ofthe collection ofland tax in the Wen Hui Paa, questioned why "the

Ping Jih Paa, "Diagnosing the Mania of the CP," Shanghai, April 13, 1946 (CPR).
Yang Jih Paa, "The New Offensives of the Communists," Nanjing, May 20,
1946 (CPR).
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Government has required the people to help as much as possible in the matter of the levy
of farm tax in kind and of the purchase of military provisions" when the peasants are
poverty stricken and bound by the surging interests rates?l The author would go so far as
to say "all the measures taken by the Government have the peasants as the sole object of
exploitation.,,72 At this point, when attacks against the Government were increasing, the
Kuomintang had begun to pursue a military offensive against Communist Liberated
Areas.
In July of 1946 the Kuomintang attacked the Communists in Kiangsu. The
Government forces moved "eastward [and] penetrated the hsien towns along the Grand
Canal which bisected the Communists area.',73 The Kuomintang was able to take over
many local administrations and reestablish government control. Kuomintang victory,
however, came with a price. Initial reports of the Government offensive were
characterized by claims that the generals and their troops were pursuing their own
policies as opposed to the official guidelines set forth by Chiang and his officials. At the
same time the Communists decided to abandon their retreat policy and launched a
counter offensive that undermined the weak political policies in the KMT recovered
areas. 74
Another formidable task facing the government grew out of the opposition that
they faced in the rural areas. The almost non-existent implementation of rural land reform

70Ho Ping Jih Pao," Large Areas of Land Left Uncultivated in Central Hupeh:
Agricultural Implement Relief Remains an Uncashable Check; Poor Peasants Have No
Right to Enjoy Agricultural Loans," Shanghai, April 18, 1946 (CPR).
71 Wen Hui Pao, "Bumper Crops are not Necessarily a Blessing to the Peasants,"
Shanghai, August, 24, 1946 (CPR).
72Ibid.
73 Pepper, 299.
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by the Government had caused deep rifts within rural communities. Pepper summarizes
an article in the Ta Kung Pao, a urban paper, that concluded "that the Government's only
objective in its dispute with the CCP is to regain the power to govern; all else is left
unattended.,,75 This seemed to support the earlier reports of the failings of the
Kuomintang to address the needs of the people, and its primary concern with political
victory. Similar accounts of the Government advance into the Hopei-Shantung-Honan
area were also reported. It is significant to mention at this point that articles did appear in
the urban press concerning the successful recovery of Communists occupied territories by
KMT forces. Prevailing within these texts, however, was a definite call for the
government to implement policies that are obviously drawn from Communists directives.

An article in the Shanghai press reported that the peasants would be able to retain
the right to till the land they had received from the Communists; the landowner, however,
retained official rights to the property. This compromise was seen as the best solution, yet
the conflicts that would naturally arise in implementing land to the tillers were not
addressed. 76 An article in the Wen Hui Pao concerning the recovered areas indicated the
influence of Communist policies on Government tactics even more clearly. The author
notes that "if real land reform is to be carried out, it must be clearly stipulated that a land
lord may retain only the land which he tills himself... .It will be remembered that the
equitable distribution of land and the principle of land to those who till it" are the pillars

74 Ibid.
75 Ibid., 299-300.
76 Paper's name and article's author not given, "Two Problems in Newly-recovered Areas
Urgently Requiring Attention: The Land Problem and the 'resistance currency' problem",
Shanghai, October, 1 1946 (CPR).
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of the Government's reform policies.

77

This diverges from the official policies of the

Kuomintang, which advocate technological advancements in the rural areas and some
efforts at rent reduction.
The aggression continued to escalate between the Kuomintang and the
Communists, yet there were limited references to the crisis in the 1947 editions of the
papers. The Chieh Jih Pao, a Kuomintang paper, briefly mentioned a "new" government
land policy issued at the end of 1947 that called for "a 33 percent reduction in farm rent
to counter Communist intrigues of land reformation.,,78 The article did not address the
nature of the "intrigues". The author may have been referring to the shift in Communist
policy that was taking place in regards to incorporating the needs of the middle peasants,
some rich peasants, and even landlords in late 1947 and formally in January of 1948. One
can assume that the efforts to implement this increase in rent reduction went unheeded,
like the previous attempts at Government reform. A more noticeable shift in the
Kuomintang's response to Communist policies is evident in the early months of 194~.
Land reform was completely ignored by the press until April of 1948. Articles
from the early part of the year were attacks against Mao Tse-tung with specific reference
to his address "The Present Situation and Our Task." In response to Mao's essay the
Chieh Jih Pao (KMT) newspaper characterized the policies of the Communists as a
"dictatorship by a group of ruffians for democratic government and aggression through
power politics for liberation." Mao's essay addressed the need to tum "back the wheel of
counterrevolution- of U.S. imperialism and its lackey, the Chiang Kai-shek bandit

Wen Hui Pao, "The Land and Monetary Problems Facing the 'Pacification Areas,"
Shanghai, October 25, 1946 (CPR).
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gang... [and pursue the] extinction for Chiang Kai-shek's twenty-year counter
revolutionary rule.,,79 He also stressed the need to reinforce the policy set forth in the
October 1947 manifesto of the People's Liberation Army that included the call to
unite workers, peasants, soldiers, intellectuals and businessmen, all
oppressed classes, all people's organizations, democratic parties, minority
nationalities, overseas Chinese and other patriots; form a national united
front; overthrow the dictatorial Chiang Kai-shek government; and
establish a democratic coalition government.80

This policy would be carried out through the land revolution, the subsequent increase in
production, and the ultimate goal of industrialization. The policies hardly seem to
indicate the use of power politics; rather they address the demands of the people for
unification and social revolution. Mao was accused by Kuomintang organs of following
"on the heels of Stalin in starting and organizing the Communist International in Europe
by trying to set up a Communist International front of a like nature in Asia" with the
ultimate goal of combining the twO. 81 Mao, saw the New Democratic Revolution in
China as an inspiration to oppressed nations and also as a tool of "assistance to the
oppressed people now struggling in many countries in Europe and the Americas.',s2 But a
formal call for a united Comintern was never made. In March the attacks against Mao
and the Communist "bandits" continued, this time stressing the need to "scent out the

78Chieh Jih Pao (KMT CC Clique), "New Land Policy Adopted in North China to Fight
the Communists," Peiping, December 1947 (CPR).
79Mao Tse-tung, "The Present Situation and Our Tasks," Selected Works 5: 157.
8° Ibid., 169.
81 Hua Pei Jin Pao (KMT MOl), "A Review of the World Movement in the Light of the
confession of Bandit Mao Tse-tung," Shanghai, January 6, 1948 (CPR).
82Mao Tse-tung, "The Present Situation and Our Tasks," Selected Works, 5:158.
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mainstay of the bandit forces and have it exterminated.''!!3 The main goal of the
Government at this point seemed to have been the elimination of the Communists, with
little focus on the elimination of social, political, and economic forces impeding the
growth of modem China.
The government aptly described their policy as opposite to the approach they
took against the Japanese. Instead of "settlement of a military campaign [with the
Communist Party and the risk of] international sympathy and support [being] reduced and
weakened" if a settlement would have been reached, the Party sought to destroy the
Communists without negotiations.

84

The government openly acknowledged that it would

have been more willing to settle with the Japanese, then with the Communists and would
thus avoid the possible loss of foreign aide to the Nationalist government. Politics once
again prevailed over the needs of the people as the prevalent theme of Kuomintang
policy. Land reform would reemerge as a prominent issue in the middle of 1948 with the
promulgation of a new approach by Kuomintang General Fu Tso-yi.
General Fu Tso-yi theories concerning land reform marked a pivotal shift in the
Kuomintang's implementation of their land reform policy. An editorial by the General in
Ping Ming Jih Paa outlined the two tasks facing the Kuomintang government. The first
was to attack the enemy; the second task was "consolidating our interior situation (or, to
use shocking words, preventing a collapse from within).',s5 He called upon the
government to address the needs of the people and then engage in an effort to mobilize

83 Peiping Jih Paa (Kuomintang),"1t is to 'Exterminate" the Bandits, Not to 'Prevent' the
Bandits," Peiping-Tientsin, March 21, 1948 (CPR).
84Ibid.
85 Ping Ming Jih Paa (General Fu Tso-yi), "Striking Blows at the Enemy and
Consolidating Our Interior Situation," Peiping-Tientsin, March 23, 1948 (CPR).
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the masses to win the anti-Communist campaign. A realization on the part of some
officials that the Communists were at least pursuing an effective strategy to meet the
needs of the masses and mobilize in defense of their cause is apparent.
The land problem was heralded as the preeminent issue facing the Government.

Hsin Min Paa a pro-Kuomintang paper clearly stated, "the Communists Party had
achieved ~uch success in handling the [land] problem.',s6 The land problem was essential
and if dealt with successfully, the masses could be easily mobilized to support a military
cause. General Fu Tso-yi apparently advocated a distinctly Chinese Communist policy of
"restricting wealthy farmers, protecting middle-class farmers and assisting poor farmers"
yet its implementation took on the distinct character of weak and shoddy leadership by
Kuomintang officials. 87
The program called for two distinct policies, one for areas previously occupied by
the Communists and another for those always under Government control. The program
called for the recovery and redistribution of lands seized during the Communist struggles.
All those who participated in the recovery of land would receive land and the amount
they received would be

according to actual requirements of individuals concerned...a reasonable
equalization of land properties shall be sponsored [including land not
affected by the struggle movement]. Last of all the government shall
purchase (surplus) land and reallocate it [and] a cooperative production
method shall be adopted in the redistributed farms. 8

Hsin Min Paa (Pro-Kuomintang) "The Solution of the Land Problem," Peiping
Tientsin, May 25, 1948 (CPR).
87 Peiping Jih Paa (Kuomintang), "Outlines of Land Reform Program Drawn Up,"
Peiping-Tientsin, June 3, 1948 (CPR).
88 Ibid.
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The policy in areas where the Communist presence was not felt would still pursue rent
reduction with the ultimate aim of redistribution. The land program also stipulated that to
receive property you had to participate in the recovery movement and help to suppress
Communist forces. Anyone "who after the recovery of the locality" is still willing to
"collaborate and work for the bandits will have their land properties and other assets
confiscated.',s9 The foundation of the General's concept bears a strong resemblance to
Communist policies, both in its aim ofland distribution and the means through which
they sought to mobilize the poor, middle, and wealthy peasants.
An article that appeared in Cheng Yien Pao a Kuomintang backed paper, actually
advocated a socialist revolution. It noted that

[a] unique feature ofthe Chinese Revolution is that, while it want [sic] to
develop Capitalism, it aims also at bypassing Capitalism and achieving
Socialism. The only effective means of solving this self-contradiction
consists of State ownership of industries, limitation of capital, and
equitable distribution ofland advocated by the late Dr. Sun Yat
sen....Therefore, if the Kuomintang wants to restore its original character
which it had in the late Dr. Sun Yat-sen's days .. .it must carry out, not just
a Capitalist democratic revolution, but rather a Socialist proletarian
revolution. If it wants to do so, it must represent the interests of the mass
of laborers and farmers first, and its social basis must be the laborers and
farmers. 9o
It calls upon the Kuomintang to transcend social and class distinctions and become the
party that can incorporate all areas in to a unified revolution. The Communist Party in
China had been pursuing this policy during the anti-Japanese war as well as intensifying
its efforts to promote a socialist revolution during the years immediately following the

89 Hua Pei Jih Pao (KMT MOl), "New Land Policy Mapped Out by Hope Govt [sic],"
Peiping, June 8, 1948 (CPR).

90Cheng Yien Pao (Local KMT Organ, Connected with Wu Shao-shu), "Problems of
Social Basis and of Cliques and Faction," Shanghai, n.d. (CPR).
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defeat of the Japanese. The shift of Communist policy in 1949 to addressing the needs of
the cities marked the incorporation of a successful rural movement into the overall plan
for revolution. The suggestion for a proletariat revolution on the part of Kuomintang
supporters suggested a concession to the victory of the Communist cause, in terms of
what it had accomplished while the civil war was going on.
Official Kuomintang policy varied little from its initial tasks as set forth in their
1937 Land Law. A noted shift in the necessity of land reform as a tool for winning the
revolution is evident, however, as the war progresses. Communist polices were
addressed and adapted to meet the political needs of the Kuomintang in a last ditch
attempt to maintain political power. The middle forces played a significant role in the
ultimate defeat of the Kuomintang and in the promulgation of public sentiment that
suggested the Government was failing. An examination of the role of the middle forces
and their responses to rural land reform will provide the final component of the response
that the land reform movement generated in the cities.

The Middle Forces Respond
The middle forces in China represent the interests of a variety of political forces
that have developed ideologies and risen to a certain level of public stature. The
Republican Period of China (1912-1927) saw the rise and fall of a variety of interest
groups and marked the beginning of the development of more sound political groups. It
is in this era that the

the fires of radical youth protest associated with the New Culture
Movement of 1915 and the May Fourth Movement of 1919 conjoined with
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the inspiration of the Bolshevik Revolution to give rise in 1921 to the birth
of the Chinese Communists party.91

In addition to the Communist Party, the China Youth Party, and the "Third Party" that
grew out of the Kuomintang in 1927 were significant political players. Other
organizations of prominence would evolve and such parties as the: All-China General
Trade Union, the Chinese Anti-Imperialist/Anti-Fascist League, and the Shanghai Labor
Group Coalition appeared in the mid- 1930's. Under the banner of resistance to Japan
these groups were able to demand, "armed resistance to Japan based on mobilization of
the Chinese people [and] the formation of an All-China Committee for National
Defense,,92 It is evident that the ideas set forth in this policy are indicative of early
attempts of the Communist Party to align with the middle forces.
Japanese aggression and failed efforts to pacify the divisions between the
Communists and the Nationalists only intensified the concerns of the middle forces, who
had hoped to utilize the peaceful coexistence of both groups as a means to express their
political ideologies. The need for an organized body though which to expound on their
ideas led several minority parties to organize the United National Construction League
(UNCL) in 1939. 93 From the outset the UNCL had the backing of the Communist Party
because of its aims in resisting Japan and forming a democratic coalition style
government. Attempts by the UNCL to mediate the Kuomintang- Communist disputes

91Thomas Lutze, "New Democracy: Chinese Communist Relations with the Urban
Middle Forces, 1931-1952" (Ph. D diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1996), 220.
92Ibid., 251 (The ideas set forth in the above quotation were drawn from an assessment of
the Six Point Program proposed by the CCP on April 20, 1934. The directive was
originally titled the "Chinese People's Basic Programme for Fighting Japan")
93 Ibid., 267.
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only met with failure, and prompted the fonnation of the Federation of Chinese
Democratic Parties in March of 1941.
The Federation outlined ten points all of which coalesced around "resistance [of
Japan] to the end...end to one-party control over the State...establish real unity... [and] to
protect the legitimate expression of public opinion.,,94 The policies advocated by the
Federation spread in both influence and range of support. In September of 1944 to meet
the growing demands of China's democratic elements the Federation made membership
open to individuals and changed its name to the Chinese Democratic League. The CCP
and League shared many of the same aims and their ideas converged in the policies set
forth in Mao's "On Coalition Government." 95
The Democratic League would be the most important group that the Chinese
Communist Party sought as an ally. Their independent character and inclusion of
students, businessmen, and intelligencia made them an invaluable source when the
Communists pursued the ultimate goal of a socialist revolution of the proletariat in the
cities. Other groups and individuals did exist, however, and were also essential to the
Communist's plan for revolution. The other political parties represented a variety of
interest groups, laborers, scientists, and intellectuals. These organizations "served to
spread the influence of the DL. ...They also offered their leaders a platfonn from which
they might speak and act independently of the League.',96 These groups would take on a
more significant role when the Democratic League was disbanded by the Kuomintang. In

94 Van Slyke, 174-5.
95The above assessment was drawn largely from Thomas Lutze's research into the CCP
and their relationship with League and the influence of Mao's essay "On Coalition
Government." For an in depth and thorough analysis of the relationship an examination
of Chapter 5 (in particular pages 278-340) in Lutze's dissertation is recommended.
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addition to these groups, the opinions of non-Communist and non-Nationalist individuals
also had an impact on the role of the middle forces. One such individual was
anthropoligist Fei Xiaotong.
Fei was a western trained scholar who was best known for his illuminating book
on life in a Chinese village, his reports on the development of agriculture and industry in
southwest China, and a several articles addressing the gentry in Chinese society. A series
of articles written by Fei in 1947 and 1948 to urban newspapers suggested his concern
over the condition of China's agrarian system and the methods through which he felt the
land issue could be resolved.
Fei's essay, Rural Livelihood: Agriculture and Handicraft, addressed the
importance of a strong rural economy in terms of the economy and in fostering a
productive relationship between the cities and the countryside. Fei noted that "[w]hen
one comes to examine the economic decline of the country, what strikes one most
forcefully is the system by which tenant farming is carried on.'B7 He aptly assed the
tenant landlord relationship as one that exploited the tenant farmer and forced peasants to
"find other sources of income or go into debt.,,98 The entire system of hired labor and
tenant farming reflected a lack of organization and bad cultivation techniques.
To solve the agrarian crisis, Fei advocated redistribution of land. Although the
farmers' holdings would only increase minutely, Fei felt that ''the farmers ...could live
fairly well on what they themselves produced," without having to pay rent.99 He noted

96yan Slyke, 191.
97Fei. 110.
98Ibid., 112.
99Ib id., 113.
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that land redistribution did not address the larger issue of overpopulation in the rural
areas, however, it did provide for a minimum standard of well-being and dependence.
Fei's observations stemmed not only from the emphasis on land reform during the civil
war, but also from his own investigation into the rural economy of Yunnan. Prior to his
statements concerning land reform in 1946, Fei had noted that the

natural environment is so poor that agriculture cannot provide them with a
livelihood...the distribution of wealth is not even. There are rich people
who possess a larger share of the income from the land. Therefore, the
actual deficiency from many of the households [is substantial]. 100
Fei's report acknowledged that an overhaul ofthe agrarian system was necessary
not only for the social welfare of the rural people, but also for the growth of a
modern economy. Fei's contribution as a voice ofthe middle forces was
significant and helped to lend credence to the Communist policies.
The response of the middle forces to the land reform policies of the Communists
made an impact on the success of the revolution both in the countryside, but more
significantly in the cities. An examination of the urban responses to land reform by the
minority parties will complete the analysis of the urban response in general, provide an
analysis of the democratic elements positions and ideologies, and make evident how each
group sought to politicize their own agenda. Ultimately, the policies advocated by most
middle groups aligned well with the advancements made by the Communists, thus
securing the Communist defeat of the Kuomintang.

It is important to realize, however,

that the political ambitions ofthe middle forces were never fully put aside and unity
politically was not advocated. The most important issue became the common elements
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drawn from each party's policies and how they accentuated what the Communists were
actually accomplishing.
The earliest documentation of a middle force response to the civil war called for a
settlement to the Kuomintang and Communist disputes and it came in 1945 from the
Democratic League. It was evident in the early stages of the civil war that the League
advocated that the "[p]olitical administration in China...must be democratized in order to
live up to the unanimous anticipations of the people."IOI There was no mention ofland
reform in 1945 on the part of most of the middle forces. Yet the concept of a united
government that addressed the varying needs of the people, had been advocated by the
Communists as well. Mao's "On Coalition Government" established the basis for
unifying with minority parties by acknowledging that

an urgent need exists beyond all doubt for representatives of all political
parties and groups of people without party affiliation to unite and establish
a provisional democratic coalition government so as to carry out
democratic reforms ...thereby defeating the Japanese aggressors and
liberating the Chinese people from their clutches. 102

Thus the early focus on political unity rather than sustentative social issues was not an
attempt to bypass the needs of the people, as indicated by some of the Kuomintang's
responses, but rather an attempt to form a political system to address the needs of the
people without war. Many parties, like the Democratic League, focused on the political
issues of the time and predominantly the need to settle the Kuomintang/Communist

lOOFei Xiaotong and Chih-I Chang, Earthbound China: A Study ofRural Economy in
Yunnan, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1945), 158.
IOIChungking (by mail) "Chairman of China Democratic League Writes Letter to Chiang
and Mao," Shanghai, October 3, 1945 (CPR).
I02Mao Tse-tung, "On Coalition Government," Selected Works, 4:244.
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disputes. Politically the motivation behind these responses is also an attempt by the
middle forces to gain strength and support in their own right. A report from the
vernacular press noted that the Communist Party's support of the Three People's
Principles was ''tactic recognition of the fact that the Kuomintang is a central guiding
influence... and that they themselves will be willing to participate... as a minor political
party.,,103 This response, as well, indicated that the primary concern of the middle forces
was a political resolution yet this author seems to advocate the Kuomintang as the
superior political party.
Additional calls for the Communist Party to withdraw from conflict, in favor of
Nationalist rule, came from a citizen organization, and were reported in the Republican
Daily News. The organization claimed

those who attempt to break the national unification and to hinder the task
of reconstruction will no doubt be abandoned and disliked by the people.
At the moment when the Central Government is starting the work of
rehabilitation...we earnestly hope that you will give up your prejudices
and will stop attacking actions and cooperate with the Central
Government.104

The need to end to all hostilities permeated the press at this time as well, indicating the
exhausted state of affairs following the war of anti-Japanese aggression. A shift in the
nature ofthe articles by the middle forces, however, was evident in late May of 1946.
Addressing the politics of the parties was complimented by an effort to tackle the more
real and concrete needs of the people.

103"Vemacular Press Comments on Joint Communique of Results ofKuomintang
Communist Negotiations," Shanghai, October 12, 1945 (CPR).
I04Min Pao Jih Pao (Tientsin Republican Daily News), "Citizen Association Wire Mao
Tse-Tung to Stop Civil War," Peiping- Tientsin, November 29, 1945 (CPR).
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An article that appeared in the Emancipation Journal of May 25, 1946 made a
direct and outright attack on the government's land policies. It noted that

a comparison of the robbery of land by corrupt Kuomintang officials and
the gratis distribution of land taken over by the Northeast democratic
government to the poor farmers and hired workers on the farms will
clearly show who is actually working for the benefit and welfare of the
people. 105

The rural land reform policies of the CCP and the democratic governments in the
Northeast had definitely made an impression on the middle forces and highlighted the
deficiencies in the Government's own policies. Calls to settle the Kuomintang and
Communist dispute continued in 1946 yet this time they were characterized by distaste
for the Nationalist government. An independent paper, Hsin Min Wan Pao, called for the
opposing parties "to settle their differences, they should take into consideration the hopes
and desires of the people...the party in power has paid little attention to the people's
hopes and desires."lo6 The need to focus on social issues was again made evident by the
minority factions. A profound call to address the needs of the people was set forth in
August of 1946 by the China Land Society.
The China Land Society's Chairman of the Board of Directors, Hsiao Cheng, set
forth a guide for land reform that was published in the Ta Kung Pao (Shanghai). The
policy called for a democratic government, but to achieve true unity it was necessary to
engage in all out land reform. Article 3 called for adherence to Sun's principles of those
who till the land shall own it and outlined seven steps for insuring its implementation.

105The Emancipation Journal, "Who is Exploiting the People?" Peiping-Tientsin, May 25,
1946 (CPR).
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The plan was set forth as follows: (1) all land (bought, sold, or received as a gift) must
be tilled by the owner; (2) land not tilled by the owner is to be requisitioned by the
government; (3) once requisitioned that land should be divided into farms and given to
peasants to till; (4) the land must be paid for in increments over a 15-20 year period; (5)
land loan certificates can be claimed for goods or their equivalent in money; (6) land loan
certificates may be bought and sold, as well as exchanged for stock in government run
companies; (7) all redistributed land should be managed under co-operative farms.107
The plan set forth a basic outline to carry out land reform in a manner that would
ease the transition from a feudal agrarian economy. The plan also outlined the economic
and political implications that a thorough land reform policy would bring about noting,
"actual participation in politics by farmers should be achieved at the same time as land
reform. And land reform will become the basis for the achievement of permanent national
unification and true democracy in this country.,,108 The realization that land reform was
necessary and a vital element to the revolution had become more apparent as the lan4
reform campaign of the Communists intensified. Significant to note is that the China
Land Society seems to have been a pro-Kuomintang middle force. Little information
pertaining to the nature and ideologies of the Society was available, but a note at the end
of the article mentioned that Hsiao Cheng was a close friend of Chen Kuo-fu, ViceMinister of Economic Affairs. Regardless of their political orientation the Society made
a profound appeal on behalf of the rural areas.

Hsin Min Wan Pao (Independent), "What are the Hopes and Desires of the People?"
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In the course of assessing the middle forces role in influencing the opinion of the
people, an interesting article appeared in the Sin Wen Pao, advocating the "third parties"
to enlarge. The article called upon the middle forces to enlarge their scope as well as
their efforts to include "the real Third Parties [which] are the people, the people
throughout the country."I09 Advocating including the people in party affairs followed
uniformly with the principles of democratic government. However, the article also called
upon the Communist Party to realize "the true wishes of these Third Parties-the people
throughout the country... [who] can no longer tolerate such a farce as the Communistsponsored 'People's Assembly."l1o This attack against the Communist party mirrored an
earlier attack made against the Kuomintang by the same news organ.III It is unclear as to
which party this paper is affiliated with, the only consistent ideology it pursued was
maintaining and improving the rights of the people. Another organization that promoted
the civil rights of the masses was the China Peasant Party.
The China Peasant Party issued its manifesto in May of 1947. The six-point ,
manifesto began with the primary goal of the Party "to win for the peasants status of
master of the country, and to labor for political reforms as well as agricultural and rural
improvements."lI2 Once again solving political disputes is the main focus, yet the
obvious inclusion of land reform by a Peasant Party suggested that it saw a solution to the
rural problem as necessary to attain a friendly political environment. The Party does
make mention of its solution to the rural issue, with a pointedly anti-Communist flavor:

Wen Pao, "Enlarge the Third Parties," Shanghai, October 19, 1946 (CPR).
11OIbid.
lll Sin Wen Pao was also used as a source to document discontent with the Kuomintang's
politics and rural land policies. Refer to footnote 52 above.
I09 Sin
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It is our opinion that the way to improve rural economy is to lay stress on
political reforms and on the enforcement of law and order so that the
wealth and production of the farmers will not be illegally exploited no be
concentrated in cities. At the same time, this does not mean to rob the rich
farmers or petty landowners for the benefits of the poor peasants....Our
first effort will be to enable the peasants... [and] through their own
industry and economy, they may gradually improve their living
conditions. I 13

It can be concluded that the China Peasant Party represented the interests of wealthy
peasants and small landlords, rather than the middle and poor peasants. Its attack on
distributing land to the poor is an open criticism of CCP practices, yet they offer no
viable solution to the problems that faced the poor who comprised most of the peasant
class.
How peasant industry and economy were developed and incorporated the needs of
the poor is hastily brushed over in favor of advocating a policy that promoted production
and industry. One must ask, how was the growth of production and industry possible
without establishing a base for its growth? The Communists proposed and carried out a
solution to the rural issue that allowed for industry and production to eventually flourish;
addressing the needs of the poor peasants first and then unifying with the middle peasants
and ultimately the rich peasants ensured that the Communist plan for production would
succeed.
A significant gap in available material regarding the response generated by the
middle forces in the cities is evident following the June 1947 publication of the abovementioned article. The next media report concerning the views of the third parties came

Ta Kung Pao (Independent, Political Science Group), "China Peasant Party Issues
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in January 1949. There was no suggestion in the newspapers that I analyzed as to why
the middle forces' opinions were being omitted, but one can logically assume that the
Kuomintang's restriction on the media in the last years of the civil war was responsible.
On October 27, 1947 "the decision was taken to outlaw the [Democratic] League as
accessory to the 'Communist bandits' .,,114 This in effect silenced the minority parties who
had often used the League as a base from which to voice their ideologies and political
agendas.
The resurgence of news coverage of the middle forces came in 1949, albeit on a
very limited scale. Two articles that appeared in the Yi Shi Pao ( a Catholic news
organ)in January of 1949 were the only evidence that minority parties existed until the
end ofthe civil war. 1l5 On January 19, 1949 an editorial was published in a Shanghai
paper that expounded upon the ideas set forth by Chinese Catholics. 116 The poor are the
focus of the article and

are truly the 'innocent people' who fonn the majority of the population.
Yet these poor people are continuously being subjected to exploitation,
oppression, threats, trickery and sacrifice. They are used as the tools for
the struggle for poor, and at the same time are the objects of the fight for
control. 117

113 Ibid.
1l4Van Slyke, 199.
115This discrepancy in infonnation may be attributed to the resources that were available
for me to investigate.
116The role of the Catholic Church was presumably small in the over all politics of the
civil war. However, a Catholic influence in atleast some rural villages is evident.
William Hinton's documentary Fanshen includes a thorough analysis ofthe significant
role the Church played in the village of Long Bow.
117 Yi Shih Pao (Chinese Catholic Organ), "Let's See Who Are Really for the People,"
Shanghai, January 19, 1949 (CPR).
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The article continued by accentuating the horrible conditions that the poor are subjected
to and the corruption and inefficiencies that characterized the Government. The
Communist's policies in the liberated areas are also mentioned (though the writer
acknowledges that "our personal experience is lacking") and condemned as nothing more
than "human-sea tactics... [and] a 'final reckoning' policy [that makes] many
unreasonable changes in the social system, in the mode ofliving and in moral
conceptions.,,118 The concerns of the Church were that the civil war has made it difficult
for it to proselytize. The Church's undocumented and unfounded criticisms of the
Communists give the Church little credibility as being an unbiased source through which
the people can be liberated.
A follow up article outlined eight demands of the people as interpreted by the
Catholic Church and addressed land reform as being one of the principle means through
which harmony could be realized. The Church advocated that basic civil liberties were a
necessary component to peace. However, they feel that the "existing social order,
including the family system, the present moral and ethical codes, must not be changed,,119
It is unclear as to how the tumultuous situation in China could be pacified by the Church

without making a significant social upheaval. The mere suggestion in article seven of the
Church's policies that the "principle of 'land to the tiller' must be realized" implicated a
radical change in the existing social order.120 Despite the anti-Communist rhetoric of the
Catholic Church, the realization that land reform was necessary and that the principle of
land to the tillers should be realized indicated that the land reform program of the

118 Ibid.
119 Yi Shih Pao (Chinese Catholic Organ), "Whether in War or Peace, the People's
Demands Must be Considered," Shanghai, January 20, 1949 (CPR).
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Communist Party had made an impression. The demands set forth in the article were the
last indication by a middle force in the newspapers that I examined that felt land reform
was necessary.
It is evident, even this late in the revolution that the struggle for prevailing

political ideologies was still being waged. Ultimately, the middle forces saw as the only
- means to end the war indirectly, if not emphatically, the land reform policies set forth by
the Communists. Mao's call for a coalition government inspired the third parties to
support the party that would hopefully allow them to attain political independence.
The middle forces, regardless of their political aims were necessary components
of the revolution to assure Communist victory. Thomas Lutze appropriately concludes
that

politically these forces were an important part of the destabilization of the
Nationalist government from within its own urban
strongholds....Economically, they were to playa critical role immediately
in the maintenance of production to support the revolution. 121

It is evident by the responses the middle forces generated in the urban press that they

were a prominent factor in destabilizing the Kuomintang control of the cities. Their open
criticisms of Kuomintang policies and their realization that the policies being pursued by
the Communists were turning over the existing social order, albeit not exactly as they
would have done it, marked a turning point in the civil war and ensured that the
revolutionary spirit magnified by the Chinese Communist Party was leading China in a
positive direction.

12°I bid.
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Conclusion
In March of 1949 Mao Tse-tung formally announced a shift in Communist policy
that ended the focus on the rural areas. The statement was issued in his report to the
Second Plenary Session at the Seventh Central Committee meeting. Mao concluded that
"[t]he period of 'from the city to the village' and of the city leading the village has now
_ begun.... The center of gravity of the Party's work had shifted from the village to the
city.,,122 Having accomplished the goal ofmobilizing the peasants, the Communist Party
saw its opportunity to mobilize the workers and lead the revolution of the proletariat.
The Party was faced with a difficult task, one that required the Party itself to urbanize and
adapt what it had accomplished in the countryside to what needed to be done in the cities.
Although the countryside accounted for nearly eighty percent of the population, the cities
contained the vital elements for production to flourish and for a socialist revolution to
unfold. This task was made somewhat easier by what the Party had accomplished in the
countryside through the land reform movement.
Land reform had abolished the feudal system of agriculture and made possible the
overthrow of the rural elite. By destroying the political and economic power of the local
landlord class, the Communist Party laid the foundation for a new order to emerge.
Communist policies and ideologies were thus able to permeate the masses and provided
the base from which the Communist Party could draw upon for political and military
support. While struggling with rural issues the Party always maintained that ultimately

121Lutze, Thomas D, "The Battle for the Middle Forces: United States Relations with the
Chinese Communist Party 1947-1948," 47.
122 Mao Tse-tung, "Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central
Committee." Selected Works, 5:363.
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the proletariat would lead the revolution and the peasant masses would provide the
support needed to accomplish the revolution. It was in light of these goals that the urban
response to the rural land reform movement was significant.
It is evident that all political factions that existed during the civil war realized the

significance of land reform and what it meant both in terms of a social revolution and
political power. The theme that prevailed in the urban responses to land reform focused
more on the political implications of land reform and more specifically how each party
could utilize the land reform movement to gain a popular base of support.
The Kuomintang addressed the rural social crisis with the popular slogan 'land to
the tiller', but in actuality scant attention was focused on the masses. The primary goal of
the Government was the elimination of the Communists. It was not until the policies of
the Communist Party in the rural areas began to take hold and uproot the old ruling order
that the Kuomintang realized that mobilizing the masses was necessary if they were to
going to maintain political control. By the time the Government made an effort to ,
address rural issues, they had already become an ineffective ruling body for the masses.
One can note the sharp changes in the implementation of the Kuomintang land
reform policies that bear a strong resemblance to the practices already being implemented
in the Communist liberated areas. The urban response, both pro-Kuomintang and anti
Kuomintang, indicated that the social revolution that had begun under the leadership of
the Communists was necessary for both the growth of modem China and for the control
of the government. Urban journalists called upon the Kuomintang to address the needs of
the masses to alleviate the economic and social burdens they were facing and pro
Kuomintang papers also saw the need for the Government to maintain political control of
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the country. As the political crisis facing the Kuomintang deepened, a shift in the urban
response, even on the part of Kuomintang organs is noticeable, as the cries for democracy
and political unity overshadow the call for the Government to maintain control.
The middle forces had little influence as far as implementing policy and practice
are concerned yet their opinions and support were necessary for either the Kuomintang or
the Chinese Communist Party to win the war. From the outset, the middle forces had
been recognized as a key component of the Communist victory over the Kuomintang.
The Communist Party had consistently advocated a coalition government and thus
secured the cooperation of most minority parties and most significantly the Democratic
League. The Kuomintang, however, made little effort to cooperate with the middle
forces and was responsible for their suppression during the later half of the civil war. It is
evident in the middle forces responses to the land reform movement that they were fed up
with the Kuomintang and its failed attempts at social, political, and economic reform.
The middle forces saw a chance to establish themselves as strong, independent polit~cal
organizations by following on the heels of the Communist Party's practice of efficient
politics and mobilization of popular support.
Although Communist ideologies were not always consistent with those advocated
by the middle forces, the accomplishments made by the Communist Party were far
greater than those by the Kuomintang, thus solidifying the middle forces hope for a
coalition government. The middle forces also carried a significant amount of influence in
terms of popular opinion, in particular those of the intelligencia, businessmen, students,
and professionals, who comprised most of their organizations. Thus maintaining their
support was critical for Communist victory.
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The urban response to the rural land reform movement indicated that the Chinese
Communist Party was effective in influencing the opinions ofKuomintang officials, anti
Government organs, and the middle forces. Although the ideologies and practices of the
Communists were not always consistent with the goals of urban forces, the
accomplishments they made had a significant impact on their influence in the cities. The
urban newspapers saw land reform as an opportunity to politicize their own agenda,
maintain their own identities and strive for internal peace. The actualization of land
reform and the implementation of rural land policies by the Chinese Communist Party
sparked a vigorous response across all fronts and forced a convergence of ideas as to
whether once land reform was accomplished, which party would be able to maintain
control. It is in that regard that one can conclude why the Communist Party was able to
maintain control. They organized, implemented and successfully carried out a rural land
reform movement that abolished the old order and laid the base from which their political
ideologies could grow, thus maintaining their independence and broadening their bas,e of
support.
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